Incentive compability of dual transfer pricing by Carstens, Stefan & Weinem, Michael
econstor
www.econstor.eu
Der Open-Access-Publikationsserver der ZBW – Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
The Open Access Publication Server of the ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die ZBW räumt Ihnen als Nutzerin/Nutzer das unentgeltliche,
räumlich unbeschränkte und zeitlich auf die Dauer des Schutzrechts
beschränkte einfache Recht ein, das ausgewählte Werk im Rahmen
der unter
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
nachzulesenden vollständigen Nutzungsbedingungen zu
vervielfältigen, mit denen die Nutzerin/der Nutzer sich durch die
erste Nutzung einverstanden erklärt.
Terms of use:
The ZBW grants you, the user, the non-exclusive right to use
the selected work free of charge, territorially unrestricted and
within the time limit of the term of the property rights according
to the terms specified at
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
By the first use of the selected work the user agrees and
declares to comply with these terms of use.
zbw
Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Carstens, Stefan; Weinem, Michael
Working Paper
Incentive compability of dual transfer
pricing
Diskussionsbeiträge aus dem Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Universität -
Gesamthochschule - Essen, No. 114
Provided in cooperation with:
Universität Duisburg-Essen (UDE)
Suggested citation: Carstens, Stefan; Weinem, Michael (2000) : Incentive compability of
dual transfer pricing, Diskussionsbeiträge aus dem Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften,
Universität - Gesamthochschule - Essen, No. 114, http://hdl.handle.net/10419/40942 
Diskussion Papers 
from the 
Department of Economics 





INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY  















Keywords: Agency theory, Bayes-Nash equilibrium, dual transfer pricing, incentive compati-
bility, risk dominance 
 
JEL Classification Numbers: D82, M41 
 
   1
Abstract 
We examine the implementation of efficient decisions about accepting a special order 
with asymmetric information by means of a dual transfer pricing mechanism based on Ronen 
and McKinney (1970). The model is designed in a simple fashion, two vertically related divi-
sions within a firm (manufacturing and distribution) process a special order of a single prod-
uct. Each division manager has private information about the divisional parameters (produc-
tion costs and profit margin) and both report simultaneously to the other manager. The reports 
mutually affect the managers’ payoffs by determining the transfer payments which are payed 
to both divisions. Subsequently, based on the reports, the principal decides if the special order 
will be accepted. The outcome of this model is that cheating is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium and 
is Pareto-efficient, but truth-telling is a dominant strategy incentive-compatible equilibrium 
and strongly risk-dominates cheating. When adding an additional stage to the game, the ac-
counting stage, it becomes clear that the incentives are inverse to those in Ronen and McKin-
ney (1970) as the incentives to cheat disappear. The reason is that the managers only receive 
the “award” from cheating if they indicate the true information in the accounting stage. If they 
choose to report untruthfully then they suffer a loss as they need to pay the difference between 
the true and the incorrectly accounted value out of their own pocket. It follows that this model 
design is more robust against cheating than the introduction of a penalty, as studied by Ronen 
(1992). Therefore, dual transfer prices are able to implement the first-best solution. These 
results also clearly disprove the main results of Wagenhofer (1994). 
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1.  Introduction 
We study the incentive compatibility of dual transfer prices in an agency-based trans-
fer pricing model according to the seminal article of Ronen and McKinney (1970). The dual 
transfer pricing scheme makes use of two separate pricing methods to price each interdivi-
sional transaction. Ronen and McKinney have shown that efficient decisions are implement-
able if the manufacturing division is credited the average profit margin and if the distribution 
division is debited the average manufacturing costs.  
The issue of managerial behavior within an operational network of departments, rela-
tions and decisions is still relevant and worth to revisit. The predominant problem is the exis-
tence of private information on the part of the managers of the operational units. If mutually 
dependent decisions are associated with uncertainty, the problem of cheating agents with pri-
vate information emerges. In order to solve this problem, a mechanism is needed that deters 
the agents from cheating. This ideal is known as the first-best solution, and it has been shown 
that the Groves mechanism is able to overcome the information asymmetry in many scenar-
ios. We use Wagenhofer’s simplified framework of the Ronen/McKinney model and the 
Groves payoff scheme (Groves and Loeb 1976, 1979) to solve the problem of information 
asymmetry in a production company with two vertically related divisions.  
Some other articles have investigated similar scenarios and proposed different solu-
tions for realizing incentive compatibility. Ronen (1992) suggested including a penalty factor 
in the Ronen/McKinney model in order to avoid collusion on the part of the agents. Without 
the penalty, agents are expected to cheat due to the existence of multiple Bayes-Nash equilib-
ria. Avila and Ronen (1999) show in an experimental framework that the modified model in-
cites the agents to behave more truthfully with than without the penalty factor.   3
 We study the dual transfer pricing rule in a slightly different model. A principal de-
cides upon accepting or rejecting a one-time only special order when the production capacity 
is idle and the order has no long-run implications. The principal has no information concern-
ing the realized costs of the production unit and the profit margin of the distribution division. 
The division managers have private information and announce the marginal costs and the 
profit margin simultaneously. Our analysis enlarges and refines the framework used in 
Wagenhofer (1994) to show that dual transfer prices are still incentive-compatible in various 
settings and induce efficient decisions and outcomes. Our findings also disprove Wagenhofer 
result that the dual transfer pricing rule is unable to induce efficient decisions, if collusion 
among agents cannot be prevented. 
Our analysis shows that both cheating and truth-telling are Bayes-Nash equilibria, but 
only truth-telling is an equilibrium in dominated strategies and is therefore incentive-
compatible if collusion cannot be enforced. Insofar, the game contains elements of the prison-
ers’ dilemma, and truth-telling constitutes the threat-point. 
It is often argued that the dual transfer pricing mechanism is susceptible to collusions 
in the long-run. Therefore, we have modified the mechanism in our model by changing the 
transfer prices. This mechanism is similar to the penalty rule of Ronen (1992) and rules out 
the cheating equilibrium. However, in contrast to Ronen (1992), the managers are forced to 
indicate true information in our model in the last stage of the game, the accounting stage. The 
reason is that the managers in our model tend to underestimate the costs and exaggerate the 
profit as opposed to the managers in the Ronen model. Consequently, they have to pay the 
difference to the untrue value if they decide to indicate untrue values in the accounting. This 
finding is presented in section 6 where we modify the traditional pricing scheme in order to   4
achieve more strict incentives for truthful reporting. This makes truth-telling the only attrac-
tive strategy. 
In the following section we introduce notations and define the equilibrium concept of 
Bayes-Nash. We then present the game’s solution in sections 3 and 4. In section 5 we solve 
the model in different scenarios before presenting the modified pricing scheme in section 6. 
2.  Notations and the basic framework 
Let the relevant costs in the manufacturing division be  1 θ  drawn from the finite set 
{} H L k k K , 1 = ∈ θ , where L denotes low and H high level. The profit margin of the distribution 
division from the special order is  {} H L d d D , 2 = ∈ θ . Throughout most sections of the article 
we assume the following relation between states:  H H L L d k d k < < < , which is common 
knowledge among the agents and the principal. In sections 6, 7, and 8 other relations are used, 
which is explained in the respective sections. 
Information about the divisional costs and the profit margin is privately distributed 









θ ρ  for all  {} 2 , 1 ∈ i , is strictly positive and common knowledge and 
let  () ) ( ) ( , 2 1 2 1 θ ρ θ ρ θ θ ⋅ = F  be the joint probability distribution of the agents’ types. The 
common knowledge hypothesis ensures that both agents are able to compute the conse-
quences of their behavior (Harsanyi, 1967-68).  ( ) i i i − − θ θ ρ
~
 denotes agent i’s belief concerning 
her
1 opponent’s type  i − θ  on condition that she chooses  i − θ
~
 derived by Bayes’ rule. 
The course of action is as follows: after nature determines the types of the agents, both 
agents report on their parameters: manufacturing costs and profit margin respectively. In the   5
third stage of the game, based on the reports, the principal decides whether the special order 
will be accepted and carried out. If the order has been carried out the agents are paid off based 
on their divisional profits, which in turn result from the agents’ accounting entries of their 
reported parameters. If the principal deprecates the accomplishment of the order, neither the 
agents nor the principal (i.e. the firm) receive a payoff. 
Agents are assumed to be risk-neutral. The decision rule regarding the special order is 




θ θ P s , which assigns a value of  1 = P s , if  0
~ ~
1 2 > − θ θ , and a value 
of  0 = P s , if  0
~ ~





2 Let us assume that the divi-
sions earn hypothetical profits resulting from the special order, from which the agents’ pay-
offs are derived. The manufacturing (distribution) division’s hypothetical profit is 
1 π [ ] 1 2
~
θ θ − = P s  ( 2 π [ ] 1 2
~
θ θ − = P s ), if the corresponding manager’s state of nature is  i θ , she 
reports  i θ
~
 and the other manager reports  i − θ
~
, which depends on each manager’s own type and 
on the strategies played.
3 The transfer payment equals the value of the other manager’s report, 
which captures the notion of dual transfer pricing. We assume that the agents receive a remu-
neration depending on the success of their own divisions. Thus, the agents’ utility payoffs are 
assumed to be derived from the hypothetical divisional profits in the form of a monotonic 




− [] i π φ = . A profile of strategies is compatible with 
Bayesian incentives, if the following condition holds true: 
  () [] ( ) [ ] i i i i i i i i i i u E u E θ θ θ θ θ θ
~
, , − − ≥   (1) 
for all  i θ
~
,  i − θ
~
,  i θ ,  i − θ and i, where  () ( ) ∑ − − − = i i i i i i i i u E θ θ ρ θ θ θ
~
, . In the next section we ex-
amine the agents’ optimal responses.   6
3.  Agents’ incentives under information asymmetry  
The game takes the form of an extensive game since an information set for agent i 
consists of more than one decision node. We choose the standard form, for simplicity, to rep-
resent the game, as depicted in the figure. 
The choices of the manufacturing and distribution managers are indicated by connect-
ing lines, one for each agent. The manufacturing manager selects from rows, the distribution 
manager from columns within the type-corresponding bimatrix.  
Figure 1: Standard form representation of the dual
                transfer pricing game
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We focus our analysis on divisional profits directly as the agents’ payoffs are mono-
tonic transformations of the divisional profits.
4 The upper (lower) entry in each cell denotes 
the manufacturing manager’s (distribution manager’s) divisional profit. When nature has 
drawn types, the manufacturing manager selects from rows in the upper or lower bimatrix. 
The same holds for the distribution manager referring to columns. A zero indicates that the 
principal decides that, based on the reports, the special order is unprofitable and has to be re-
jected. Negative payoffs are indicated in bold type.  
If truthful reports are expected from both agents, no agent wants to deviate from re-
porting truthfully. It can easily be seen in Figure 1 that, for example, the  − H k type’s profit 
from reporting truthfully is always at least as high as that from reporting untruthfully 
( L k = 1
~
θ ) but in some cases significantly higher. Analogous results can be derived for all other 
types. Hence both agents’ best strategies are to report truthfully. However, if the agents expect 
that the manufacturing manager always reports  L k = 1
~
θ  and the distribution manager always 
reports  H d = 2
~
θ , their expectations match as well, which follows from Proposition 1. 
Proposition 1: Given strictly positive prior probabilities  () i θ ρ  for all  {} 2 , 1 ∈ i , if 
H H L L d k d k < < <  exactly two pure strategy Bayes-Nash equilibria exist. Either both agents 
report truthfully or the agents always report  L k = 1
~
θ , and  H d = 2
~
θ  respectively, independently 
of the prior probability distribution. The truth-telling equilibrium, denoted as  1 e , is dominant 
strategy incentive-compatible and strict for all possible  ( ) i i i − − θ θ ρ
~
  {} 2 , 1 ∈ − ≠ ∀ i i , whereas 
the other one,  2 e , is not.
5   8
Proof: At first, we prove that  1 e  is an equilibrium. Since the agents’ utility payoffs are 
monotonous in the divisions’ profits, we can directly focus on divisions’ profits. Assuming 
that type  L k = 1 θ  can benefit by deviating to  H k = 1
~
θ , yields: 
  () () > − L H H H k d d d 1 ρ () () L H H H k d d d − 1 ρ () () L L L L k d d d − + 1 ρ  
 ⇔   L L k d <  
which is a contradiction.
6 Examination of  H k = 1 θ  leads to: 
  () () () () > − + − H L H L H H H H k d k d k d d d 1 1 ρ ρ () () H H H H k d k d − 1 ρ  
 ⇔   H L k d >  
if the  H k -type manufacturing manager could do better by deviating to  L k , which is 
also a contradiction.
7 In a similar way the same results can be derived with strict inequality for 
the distribution manager’s types  H d = 2 θ  and  L d = 2 θ . 
It can easily be seen by comparison of the possible outcomes in Figure 1 that for the 
same profile and for all i,  i θ ,  i θ
~
 and  i − θ
~
: 
  ( ) i i i i u θ θ θ ,
~*




− ≥  (2) 
with 
* ~
i − θ  as agent’s –i equilibrium strategy. Thus, dual transfer prices are Bayesian and 
dominant strategy incentive-compatible. 
The second equilibrium profile,  2 e , with the cheating types  H k = 1 θ  and  L d = 2 θ  pro-
vides incentives, which always satisfy condition (1) with equality. Assuming that  H k = 1 θ  
benefits by deviating from  L k = 1
~
θ  to  H k = 1
~
θ , then:   9
() () () () > − + − H H L H H H H H k d d d k d d d 1 1 ρ ρ () () () () H H L H H H H H k d d d k d d d − + − 1 1 ρ ρ  
which is not true. The same result follows for all other types. In contrast to  1 e ,  2 e  does 
not contain dominant strategies since: 
  () () H L H L L k d k k d u − = , 1 < () H H L k k d u , 0 1 =  
which violates condition (2). QED 
Consequently, both truth-telling and cheating are equilibria under individually rational 
behavior if binding agreements are excluded. Moreover, as an equilibrium with cheating be-
havior on the parts of the managers does exist under these conditions, the behavior is optimal 
in a non-cooperative setting and side-payments are not necessary.
8 Side-payments would only 
be necessary if higher net payoffs were possible for a coalition that cannot be generated by 
individually rational behavior, whereas at least some member is worse off. However, no agent 
is worse off individually by playing  2 e  strategies, as payoffs are Pareto-efficient. 
4.  Equilibrium selection 
We present an approach to the problem of multiple equilibria in this dual transfer pric-
ing model supported by equilibrium selection theory. The types of interest are  H k = 1 θ  and 
L d = 2 θ  since their reports differ in the equilibria. For types  L k = 1 θ  and  H d = 2 θ  the selection 
problem is trivial since actions are the same in both equilibria.  L k = 1 θ  always reports  L k = 1
~
θ  
and  H d = 2 θ  always reports  H d = 2
~
θ . Therefore, we focus on the two remaining types since 
their payoffs differ in a fashion as shown in Table 1. 
The table shows the difference in divisional profits of equilibrium  2 e  as compared to 
divisional profits from truth-telling for each constellation of agents’ types. The first entry of a   10
triple in each cell represents the increase in the manufacturing manager’s divisional profit, the 
second denotes the increase in the distribution manager’s divisional profit. The third entry is 
the joint probability of the respective combination of agent types. 
Since, for both agents, payoffs from equilibrium  2 e  are always at least as high as from 
equilibrium  1 e ,  2 e  is Pareto-efficient. However, as  1 e  is an equilibrium in dominant strate-
gies, collusion cannot occur without communication before reporting in order to agree on 
‘cheating’. Furthermore, each agent must be sure that the other one will keep his promise. 
Agents could only expect that  2 e  is the equilibrium if it is common knowledge that both 
agents believe  2 e  is the solution. Proposition 2 tells us that this cannot be the case if managers 
have the slightest doubt regarding the achievement of  2 e . 
Proposition 2:  Let  () [] 1 , 0 ∈ − i i θ µ  for all  {} 1 , 0 ∈ i  be the conjecture of either  H k = 1 θ  or 
L d = 2 θ  that the opponent plays equilibrium strategy  2 e . Then,  1 e  strongly risk-dominates  2 e , 
and agents prefer to play truthfully whenever agreeing to cheat is not certain.
9 
Proof: For  () [] 1 , 0 ∈ − i i θ µ , assuming  2 e  is the solution, the manufacturing manager’s 
incentive yields: 
  () ( ) H H H k d d − 1 ρ () L d 1 ρ + ( )()( ) () () [] L H L L H H d k d d k d 1 1 1 µ µ − − + −  
Distribution manager’s type   
  H d   L d  
L k   () () H L d k F , ; 0 ; 0   () () L L L H d k F d d , ; 0 ; −   Manu-
facturing man-
ager’s type 
H k   () () H H L H d k F k k , ; ; 0 −   () () L H L L H H d k F k d k d , ; ; − −  
  
  Table1: Payoff difference between cheating and truth-telling   11
 > () ( ) H H H k d d − 1 ρ   () ( )() L H H L d k d d 1 1 µ ρ − +  
⇔   H L k d >  
which is a contradiction. 
Analogously, the distribution manager’s incentive for preferring  2 e  is represented by: 
   () ( ) L L L k d k − 2 ρ () H k 2 ρ + ( )() ( ) () () [] H H L H L L k k d k k d 2 2 1 µ µ − − + −     
 >  () ( ) L L L k d k − 2 ρ () ( )() H L L H k k d k 2 2 µ ρ − +  
  ⇔   H L k d >  
which is also a contradiction. Thus both agents expect that  1 e  is the solution for all sensible 
conjectures they could make, except if  () 1 = − i i θ µ  for all  {} 1 , 0 ∈ i . Then the managers are in-
dependently indifferent. QED 
Proposition 2 shows that both managers expect that  1 e  is the solution, if there is the 
slightest doubt about the opponent’s action. They are always worse off by playing  2 e strate-
gies, unless they are mutually certain that  2 e  is the solution. In the latter case the expectation 
probability of the commencement of  2 e  must be at least 1 for both agents. Therefore, only if 
both managers could, perhaps due to some exogenous mechanism, entirely trust each other, 
the solution would be susceptible to collusion where the agents play the cheating equilibrium. 
However, it is questionable why agents, while cheating the principal, should trust each other 
without the slightest doubt. 
Put differently, both managers can, at best, achieve the same expected payoff by play-
ing  − 2 e strategies as with truth-telling, if attaching at least a probability of 1 to the opponent 
playing his  − 2 e strategy. In the presence of any uncertainty about keeping the agreement, a   12
probability of 1 cannot be applied to collusion, and therefore cheating has no chance of com-
ing true. Even if agents agree to cooperate on  − 2 e strategies before playing the game, the in-
dividual rationale of both managers is to choose   − 1 e strategies, since it keeps any option on 
gains whilst deterioration from the threat-point (i.e. the payoff the agents receive in the truth-
telling equilibrium) is impossible. 
In addition, dual transfer prices are shown to be dominant strategy incentive-
compatible. This fact has a great advantage for all participants of the game since it is very 
robust, even if agents have incorrect or perhaps contradictory beliefs. Therefore, the mecha-
nism designer does not need to be aware of the right probability distribution, which is a chal-
lenging assumption underlying Bayes-Nash. It is often argued that dual transfer prices would 
not generate a non-collusive outcome in practice because irrationality or failure to understand 
the consequences of this behavior might affect the managers’ actions. However, findings in 
experimental game theory do also provide evidence in support of equilibrium  1 e . If people are 
confronted with risk, they tend to react more sensitively to risks of losses as compared to 
chances of gains, in particular in situations where irrationalities may play a prominent role.
10 
On the other hand, there are empirical indications that people cooperate in the repeated pris-
oner’s dilemma; although, from a theoretical viewpoint, cooperation is irrational.
11 
It is straightforward that the reasoning for breaking an agreement is also valid for side- 
payments, if this were to be a component of an agreement. In contrast to Wagenhofer (1994), 
neither a  − H k type nor a  − L d type would keep the promise and it is not individually rational 
to pay, if the promised behavior of the recipient cannot be enforced. If the promised behavior 
of the side-payment’s intended recipient has already been performed nevertheless, it is not   13
individually rational to make this payment since the recipient cannot enforce the payment. 
This clearly disproves Wagenhofer’s results. 
5.  Agents’ incentives under related scenarios 
Given  H L k k <  and  H L d d <  and strict relations between all parameters, there are the 
following six conceivable type-constellations. 
 
The main results for dual transfer prices in these scenarios are as follows: in scenarios 
2 and 3, the principal does not need reports from the agents for decisions concerning the spe-
cial order. In scenario 2 (3), the principal can always accept (reject) the special order, inde-
pendently of the agents’ reports, since the order is always profitable (unprofitable). Although 
truth-telling is only one of several Bayes-Nash equilibria, dual transfer prices trivially imple-
ment efficient decisions about the special order in these scenarios. In scenario 2, the distribu-
tion manager’s (manufacturing manager’s) division profit from the special order is positive, 
regardless of her own type and of the other manager’s report. Even for the most unfavorable 
type-constellation  () L H d k ,  the division profits are always positive for both divisions. Since 
the special order will always be accepted in scenario 2 for all report combinations, truth-
No. Type  constellation 
1 kL < dL < kH < dH 
2 kL < kH < dL < dH 
3 dL < dH < kL < kH 
4 dL < kL < dH < kH 
5 dL < kL < kH < dH 
6 kL < dL < dH < kH 
 
         Table 2: Type constellations   14
telling is not necessary to implement efficient decisions.
12 Analogously, in scenario 3, with 
dual transfer pricing, it is impossible that both managers generate a positive profit from the 
special order, since in this case even the high profit margin is smaller than the low cost pa-
rameter. Therefore the special order will always be rejected.  
The only profitable type-combination in scenario 4 is () H L d k , .
13 There are two Bayes-
Nash equilibria: 1) truth-telling and 2)  H k = 1
~
θ ; L d = 2
~
θ . Truth-telling is a dominant strategy 
for both managers but, more importantly, truth-telling is Pareto-efficient. With the second 
equilibrium the special order is always rejected because, based on the reports, it is not profit-
able. Consequently, the managers always generate a division profit of zero. With truth-telling, 
the special order is accepted for the profitable type-combination () H L d k , . In this case, the 
managers generate positive division profits. If managers play equilibrium 2) strategies, their 
division profits are definitely zero. If they play the truth-telling equilibrium, they have a 
chance to generate positive profits. Thus truth-telling is also the risk-dominant Bayes-Nash 
equilibrium in this scenario. Therefore, dual transfer prices implement efficient decisions con-
cerning the special order. 
In scenario 5, if  H d = 2
~
θ   ( ) L d = 2
~
θ , the special order is profitable (unprofitable), re-
gardless of the manufacturing manager’s cost parameter. With a dual transfer price mecha-
nism, truth-telling is the strictly dominant strategy for the distribution manager. Moreover, the 
order will always be accepted (rejected) if  H d = 2
~
θ  ( ) L d = 2
~
θ , regardless of the manufacturing 
manager’s report, since the profit, based on the reports, is always strictly positive (negative). 
The manufacturing manager is indifferent about her own reporting strategies, since her report 
influences neither the decision concerning the special order nor her own divisional profit. This   15
is sufficient for implementing efficient decisions, even if the production manager chooses to 
“cheat”.  
Scenario 6 yields analogous results due to symmetry. Truth-telling is the strictly 
dominant strategy for the manufacturing manager, but not for the distribution manager. The 
efficiency of decisions about the special order depends only on the manufacturing manager’s 
report, since the order will always be accepted (rejected) if  L k = 1
~
θ   ( ) H k = 1
~
θ , regardless of 
the distribution manager’s report, because the profit, based on the reports, is always strictly 
positive (negative). Consequently, the implementation of dual transfer prices results in effi-
cient decisions within any possible binary scenario. 
6.  Modified pricing mechanism 
It is often argued that the dual transfer pricing mechanism is not robust against collu-
sion in practice and this hypothesis has been verified experimentally by Dejong et al. (1989). 
The result is attributed to the existence of multiple Bayes-Nash equilibria. Results from other 
experiments show that it is possible to overcome the trend towards collusion among the 
agents by modifying the theory slightly. Avila and Ronen (1999) introduced a penalty factor 
in a repeated game that comes into operation following the agents’ moves. The apposition of 
such a penalty factor eliminates multiple equilibria, but requires that the headquarters, respon-
sible for coordinating charges and credits to the divisions, is aware of the true costs and reve-
nues. It is argued by Avila and Ronen that the realized profits of the divisions will be revealed 
ex post by the accounting reports. However it must be expected that managers have opportuni-
ties to conceal the true information even in the accounting. 
Therefore, it seems to be useful to modify the pricing rule in order to overcome the 
trend towards collusion and cheating given that the agents’ true parameters are unknown. To   16
this end we change the pricing rule introduced in section 2 of this article in the following way: 
each manager will be charged/credited an amount depending primarily on the parameter that 
is reported and secondarily on that which is played by the other manager. Let  {} i i i θ θ θ , ∈  for 
{} 2 , 1 ∈ i , then we define the agents’ payoff functions as follows: 




θ θ θ u ( ) [ ] 1 1
~
θ θ − = t sP  (  3a) 




θ θ θ u ( ) [ ] 2 2
~
θ θ t sP − =  (  3b) 
Define  ( ) a t − = 1 1
~
θ θ  (with  ε = a  if  1 1
~
θ θ =  and if  1 1
~
θ θ =  and  2 2
~
θ θ = , and  0 = a  if 
1 1
~
θ θ =  and  2 2
~
θ θ = ), and  ( ) a t + = 2 2
~
θ θ  (with  ε = a , if  2 2
~
θ θ =  and if  2 2
~
θ θ =  and  1 1
~
θ θ = , 
and  0 = a , if  2 2
~
θ θ =  and  1 1
~
θ θ = ). ε  should be a small number. 
With the modification of this dual transfer pricing rule, the agents always prefer to 
play truthfully as truth-telling is the only equilibrium provided by this scheme. We can see 
this in the proof of Proposition 3. 




θ θ θ u ( ) [ ] 1 1
~
θ θ − = t sP   and 




θ θ θ u ( ) [ ] 2 2
~
θ θ t sP − =  denote the managers’ utility payoffs, given  0 1 1 > − − ε θ θ  and 
0 2 2 > − − ε θ θ , then the dual transfer pricing scheme implements truthful reporting. 
Proof: As the game is symmetrical, it is sufficient to focus only on the distribution 
manager’s strategies. Suppose the agents choose to report truthfully. Then, a deviation should 
provide the following incentive: 






θ θ θ θ θ θ u u <   ( 4)    17
This requires that: 






















P  (  5)   
If  2 2 θ θ = , it is straightforward that (5) is always negative, whatever the other agent 
reports. If  2 2 θ θ = , (5) is negative for  1 1
~
θ θ =  and zero for  1 1
~
θ θ = . To see this, observe that 
0
~
/ 2 = ∂ ∂ θ t  and  0
~
/ 2 = ∂ ∂ θ P s  if the agent switches from  2 2
~
θ θ =  to  2 2
~
θ θ = . Thus (5) is a 
contradiction and the only equilibrium is to report truthfully. QED 
Proposition 3 tells us that it is possible to implement a dual transfer pricing rule that is 
not vulnerable to collusive agreements among the agents. In our scheme, the amount the dis-
tribution manager is charged, depends stronger on her own report than on the other manager’s 
report and is related to the lowest specification of the profit margin,  L d . She would be 
charged  ε + L d  every time she reports  H d  and  also if she reports  L d  and the other manager 
announces  L k . 
Recalling our results derived from the traditional dual transfer pricing scheme, we can 
see that the former cheating types  H k  and  L d  have strict incentives to play truthfully now, 
since they would be punished by the mechanism with negative payoffs amounting to  ε −  if 
reporting untruthfully. On the other hand,  − L k  and  − H d agents run the risk of ending up with 
zero payoffs if reporting untruthfully, since their deal may be in danger of being rejected by 
the principal. Truthful reporting provides them a certain positive payoff amounting to 
ε − − L H k k ,  ε − − L H d d  respectively. A spin-off of this scheme is that the agents prefer to 
have low costs and a high profit margin, prior to the actual game. The reason is that the types 
H k  and  L d  run the risk of being punished even if they tell the truth, since their payoffs in   18
equilibrium may be negative, i.e.  ε − − H H k k ,  ε − − L L d d  respectively. This may incite the 
agents to make an effort. 
The flaw in this scheme is that it is impossible to rule out cheating equilibria in the 
continuous case of types, unless managers can be deterred from misreporting values in the 
accounting.
14 However, this problem can be circumvented in our model as the managers’ pay-
offs are based on their entries in the accounting that takes place in the last stage. Apparently, 
they only receive the “award” from cheating if they book the true values. Otherwise they 
would have to pay the difference between the booked values (e.g. dH) and the values that have 
been realized in their divisions (e.g. dL) out of their own pocket. To see this, note that if the 
distribution manager essentially earns dL from the market she has to account for dH cash on 
hand to the principal. The inverse logic applies for the manufacturing manager. This discour-
ages the managers from accounting untrue values. The logic here is particularly inverse to the 
one operating in the model of Ronen and McKinney (1970, 1992). In the latter model it is 
beneficial for the manufacturing manager to exaggerate her marginal costs and for the sales 
manager to understate her marginal revenues as the managers are in the position to pouch the 
difference to the true values in their own pocket without being forced to reveal the true values 
in the accounting. Therefore the pricing mechanism presented here would be worth examining 
in an experimental design to prove that the results can be confirmed empirically. 
7.  Conclusions 
We studied the special case of accepting or rejecting a special order with two verti-
cally related divisions in a dual transfer pricing model with two-sided incomplete information. 
The scenario with discrete distribution of parameters leads to the existence of two equilibria; 
in contrast multiple equilibria exist in the continuous case. Dual transfer prices implement   19
efficient decisions in both scenarios due to strong risk-dominance of truthful reporting strate-
gies since the agents cannot be absolutely sure that the other agent will keep his promise to 
play untruthfully in a non-cooperative individually rational setting. On the other hand, agents 
always behave cooperatively if cooperation is binding. However, then side-payments are not 
necessary since cheating is, from the managers’ perspective, Pareto-efficient even without 
side-payments. In the absence of the possibility to make binding agreements, collusion is not 
individually rational. 
The main results are also proven in all conceivable discrete scenarios. The equilibrium 
is only susceptible to collusion if managers are absolutely sure that the opponent will keep his 
promise, which could be accomplished due to some exogenous enforcement, for example. It 
has been shown in experimental investigations that agents tend to collude nevertheless. This 
can be influenced through differences in modeling design and test arrangements. 
A crucial issue of this model is that our remuneration rule, which is based on the man-
agers’ accounting entries, has a disciplining effect on the managers’ report decisions. As the 
managers only receive their payoffs resulting from cheating if they account for the true speci-
fications of their own parameters at the end of the game, cheating is not an appealing option. 
The agents would receive a kind of reward for cheating from the principal, who is informed 
about the cheating at the time when remuneration is paid off. On the other hand, if the agents 
accounted the untrue values, they had to pay the difference between the booked values (e.g. 
kL) and the values that are essentially realized in their divisions (e.g. kH) out of their own 
pocket. This discourages the managers from accounting untrue values. The logic here is in-
verse to the one operating in the model of Ronen and McKinney (1970, 1992). In the 
Ronen/McKinney model it is beneficial for the manufacturing manager to exaggerate his 
marginal costs and for the sales manager to understate his marginal revenues as the managers   20
are in a position to pouch the difference to the true values in their own pocket without being 
forced to reveal the true values in the accounting.  
Finally, our results are not in agreement with Wagenhofer (1994), who concludes that 
the dual transfer pricing rule is unable to induce efficient decisions among the agents. Truthful 
reporting could only be induced if collusion among the agents can be prevented and collusion 
would necessarily be accompanied by side-payments. We showed that both truth-telling and 
cheating are Bayes-Nash equilibria. They emerge exactly because of individually rational 
behavior, without the exogenously assumed ability to make binding promises. However, col-
lusion will not happen as long as the managers cannot be sure that collusion is certain. On the 
other hand, if managers are able to make binding promises, it does not suffice for the principal 
to rule out side-payments, since cheating is Pareto-efficient for both agents even without any 
side-payments. 
We have also introduced a modification of the traditional dual transfer pricing mecha-
nism similar to the inclusion of the penalty factor in the Ronen/McKinney model in order to 
overcome the problem of multiple equilibria by debiting/charging the agents the high-
est/lowest specification of their own parameters and making the principal’s decision of ac-
cepting or rejecting the special order contingent on both agents’ strategies. This rule is also 
incentive-compatible and provides first-best behavior in our model.   21
Notes 
1  We use gender-specific attributes alternately. 
2  For later computation we assume that any possible combination of reported types can also 
be interpreted as Arabic numbers starting with 1 for the smallest difference of these com-
binations, i.e.  H L k d − . 
3  Notice that the divisions’ profits may be zero if, based on the reports, the order were to be 
rejected. Therefore the payoffs also depend on the managers’ own strategies. 
4  However, we have to keep in mind that the displayed values in the payoff matrix will not 
be paid to the managers but instead a smaller fraction consisting of  i βπ , with  5 . 0 < β . 
5  An equilibrium will be denoted as strict if, given the play of the opponent, each player has 
a unique best reply (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991: 13). 
6  Since we only permit strictly positive  () i θ ρ , border solutions of  () ⋅ i E  are not possible. 
7  Notice that the  − L k type manufacturing manager earns nothing from reporting untruth-
fully, if he comes across a  − L d type distribution manager since, based on the reports, the 
special order would be regarded as unprofitable and therefore be rejected by the principal. 
8  In Wagenhofer (1994) it is wrongly concluded that side-payments would necessarily ac-
company collusion and that collusion could therefore only be prevented if side-payments 
can be ruled out. 
9  The concept of risk dominance is due to Harsanyi and Selten (1988). 
10 For experimental studies and analyses on this issue see Tversky and Kahneman (1986) and 
Cachon and Camerer (1996).   22
11 Cf., e.g., Axelrod (1981) and Smale (1980). 
12 Without truthful reports, the principal knows that the special order is profitable, but not 
how profitable it is. 
13 This type-constellation is used in Christensen and Demski (1998). 
14 There is a differentiability and a jump-discontinuity problem in the case where the special 
order turns out to be profitable and is therefore being accepted by the principal. Function 
sP is not differentiable. We ignore this problem by measuring the change of the absolute 
value of sP  according to the difference quotient  i P s θ
~
/∆ ∆  and maintaining the form 
i P s θ
~
/∂ ∂ . 
15 Control mechanisms accomplished by internal audit divisions may prevent some forgery 
of accounting reports and balance sheets (Financial Services Authority, 2002) but financial 
crime is still a major problem today and there is some evidence that this problem is persis-
tently under-managed (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2003). 
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